Who said consciousness is a congenital hallucination




















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Reprints and Permissions. Whiteley, C. Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming. Philos Stud , — Download citation. Accepted : 28 August Published : 18 September Issue Date : June Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:. Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article. Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative. Skip to main content. Search SpringerLink Search. Download PDF. Abstract Aphantasia is a recently discovered disorder characterised by the total incapacity to generate visual forms of mental imagery.

What are dreams? The imagination model of dreaming The claim that dreams in some sense involve imaginative experiences leaves open a number of more sophisticated ontological analyses of dreaming. Distribution of VVIQ scores among aphantasic subjects and control participants. So we see all these networks in the brain with different areas active at the same time, and then they diminish their activity at the same time as well.

How visual hallucinations in the psychedelic state might come about could be that in the psychedelic state, what you perceive is dependent more on the brain than the sensory data that's coming in through the eyes and the ears. And we have the opportunity now to try to characterize exactly how and why this happens. But what we experience as being real is a construction of the brain. So when I experience a particular color, that doesn't mean that color exists out there in the universe, that a red mug is actually painted some color that exists independently of my mind and brain.

No, red is something that my brain constructs in order to interpret visual information. This leads to the question, is anything real? Is anything really there? World globe An icon of the world globe, indicating different international options. Get the Insider App. Click here to learn more.



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